Issue #69 |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Last Update October 31, 2010 |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
International Is Israel Suicidal? by David Katz April 30, 2010 Israel's recent behavior makes no sense at all, even if you grant that a coalition government is often unwieldy. Insulting its closest ally, the ultimate guarantor of its safety, seems extraordinarily dumb. There is only one possible explanation: the settlement expansion was an integral part of Netenyahu's strategy, but the Interior Minister fumbled the timing. Not only does this fit the current Israeli internal politics, it fits Israeli history since the assassination of Rabin: whenever peace talks with the Palestinians look even a tiny bit hopeful, Israel scuttles the possibility by enlarging settlements and enraging the Palestinians. Defenders of Israel, when this is pointed out to them, say that the fault lies with the Palestinians. "We gave back Gaza and dismantled all settlements there, and look what happened. They elected Hamas and we got rockets instead of peace." But this tells only half the story. Gaza is a special case. It made more sense for Israel to rid itself of Gaza, always a fractious entity, than to attempt to continue to occupy and administer it. The Gaza settlements did not have the same emotional resonance as the West Bank settlements, and were easier to dismantle. (It should be noted that in Biblical times, always a reference point for the settler movement, Gaza was not central to the states of Israel and Judah, often being owned by non-Jewish nationalities. The West Bank, or Judea and Samaria, as Israeli fundamentalists refer to it, constitute some of the central areas of Jewish history.) The election of Hamas in Gaza was unanticipated by the Israelis. Instead of Fatah, which Israel could deal with, they were faced with a resolute (and reasonably effective) adversary Gazan government that refused to cooperate with Israel in any way. Israel then began a policy of blockade, economic shutdown and destabilization, and the rocket war resumed. When a cease fire was eventually reached (and largely respected by Hamas in terms of the elimination of 97% of the rocket attacks against Israel), it was sabotaged by an Israeli incursion into Gaza to kill six Hamas leaders. In Fatah, Israel now has a negotiating partner with a desire to achieve some sort of stable situation with Israel. Hamas is still unwilling, but it must be said that neither Hamas nor Fatah has any trust in Israeli talk about peace. External trends are both hopeful and discouraging. On the hopeful side, the surrounding Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, have given up on the fantasy of a military conquest of Israel, and, for their own stability, are willing to support a peace process. On the discouraging side, technology has all but eliminated even the tiny strategic depth that Israel has. It may not be possible to conquer Israel, but it is becoming more and more possible to destroy it (and its Arab inhabitants), hence the great fear in Israel of an Iranian A-bomb. The population trend is running against Israel as well. The great boost to the Jewish population count, immigration, is running dry. The list of issues that must be negotiated for a peace settlement differs from side to side. For Israel, there are only three real issues: -Determination of agreed borders For the Palestinians, the issues include: Time is running out for Israel. Let's hope the Israeli Right is smart enough to see it. |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
New York Stringer is published by NYStringer.com. For all communications, contact David Katz, Editor and Publisher, at david@nystringer.com |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||