Issue #51
Last Update May 5, 2007
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International Iraq Study Group Report (2) by David Katz January 6, 2007 In our previous article (The Iraq Study Group Report), we described the first section of the report, which provided withering criticism of the Bush Administration's entry into, and conduct of, the Iraq War. In the current article, we take a close look at the recommendations that the Study Group report contains.
As a preface to the recommendations, the report describes four courses of action that others have proposed with respect to our involvement in Iraq. Unfortunately, these courses of action are presented as straw men, to be knocked down in a paragraph or two, rather than as serious proposals meriting serious discussion. These proposals include:
1. Precipitate withdrawal. Note the loaded terminology. This course of action is rejected because “we believe it would be wrong for the United States to abandon the country through a precipitate withdrawal of troops and support. A premature American departure from Iraq would almost certainly produce greater sectarian violence ... If we leave and Iraq descends into chaos, the long range consequences could eventually require the United States to return.” (Italics added.) Note that precipitate and premature are not defined. In fact, as we shall see later, the Study Group's own recommendations promote withdrawal in the near term; this paragraph merely provides a fig-leaf for the Group's own withdrawal plan.
2. Staying the Course. The report correctly points out the “current US policy is not working ... Making no changes would simply delay the day of reckoning at high cost... Our leaving would make it worse ... The current approach without modification would not make it better.”
3. More Troops for Iraq. The report states that “Sustained increases in U.S. troop levels would not solve the fundamental cause of violence in Iraq, which is the absence of national reconciliation. A senior American general told us that adding U.S. troops might temporarily help limit the violence in a highly localized area. However, past experience indicates that the violence would simply rekindle as soon as U.S. troops are moved to another area... We do not have the troops or equipment to make a substantial, sustained increase in our troop presence.” This statement holds equally true today, as a “troop surge” is being considered by Mr. Bush. Unfortunately, the generals making these statements have all been removed and replaced by more pliant ones.
4. Devolution to Three Regions. Like the “precipitate withdrawal” option, regional devolution is rejected without serious consideration: “The costs associated with devolving Iraq into three semi autonomous regions with loose central control would be too high ... A rapid devolution could result in mass population movements ... Iraqis, particularly Sunni Arabs, told us that such a division would confirm wider fears across the Arab world that the United States invaded Iraq to weaken an Arab state ...The United States should support as much as possible central control by government authorities in Baghdad, particularly on the question of oil revenues.” (Italics added.)
Instead, the Study Group proposes 79 actions that, it believes, “could enable a responsible transition that will give the Iraqi people a chance to pursue a better future, as well as serving America's interests and values in the years ahead.”
The recommendations are these:
1. The New Diplomatic Offensive.“All the key issues in the Middle East – the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iraq, Iran, the need for political and economic reforms, and extremism and terrorism – are inextricably linked.” It proposes a new diplomatic offensive, including all regional powers (Iran and Syria are part of this recommendation) before December 31, 2006.
2. The goals of this offensive as it relates to regional players include supporting the unity and integrity of Iraq, securing Iraq's borders, promoting economic assistance, military assistance from non-neighboring Moslem countries, and helping Iraq solve the Kirkuk problem (a mixed population in an oil-rich area).
3. Create a conference or meeting in Baghdad of the Islamic Conference or Arab League to discuss the goals in (2).
4-9. An Iraq International Support Group should be organized immediately by the United Sates. The Group, as defined by the report, should include at least the following: Turkey, Iran Syria, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, Jordan and Egypt, as well as the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, the EU, and Iraq. Unfortunately, we are exactly the wrong country to take the lead in this. The Secretary of State is recommended as the US delegate, and the UN Secretary General should designate a Special Envoy. (Recommendations 5-9 are included in this description.) It is not clear what such an unwieldy group of diverse interests can accomplish, or whether, indeed, all the parties would be willing to sit at the same table. The useful part of these recommendations is the inclusion of Syria and Iran as parties to the conversation, rather than as pariahs to be ignored and shunned.
10. Iran's nuclear programs should continue to be dealt with by the Security Council. The purpose of this recommendation seems to be to take the heat off the inclusion of Iran in regional talks.
11. Persuade Iran to stay out of Iraq by stopping flow of equipment, technology and training to Iraq, supporting Iraq's territorial integrity, encourage national reconciliation, and “in the right circumstances, help the economic reconstruction of Iraq.” What's in it for Iran? The report does not address this.
12. Similarly with Syria.
13. The U.S. should encourage peace between Israel, Palestine, Lebanon and Syria.(similarly for 14)
15.(and 16and 17) lay down conditions for a Syrian/Israeli,Iraq peace. This requires major concessions on Syria's part, and Israeli return of the Golan Heights. The Palestinians would be encouraged to return to talks for a two-state solution.
18. Additional political, economic and military support for Afghanistan should be provided, some of it from resources withdrawn from Iraq. Is it too late?
19. The President should keep in touch with Iraqi leadership, and publicize this communication as much as possible.
20. The U.S. should “make clear its willingness to continue training, assistance and support for Iraq's security forces ... and the Iraqi government.” Eventually, U.S. military and civilian presence can be reduced.
21. On the other hand, if the Iraqi government does not make progress, U.S. military, civilian and economic support should be reduced.
22. The President should state that the U.S. does not seek permanent military bases in Iraq. This is one of the better recommendations.
23. The President should state that the U.S. does not seek to control Iraq's oil. This, too, is one of the better recommendations.
A series of recommendations deal with milestones for Iraq. The timetable set forth in the report has already been compromised. The milestones include:
● Approval of the Provincial Election Law setting an election date
● Approval of the Petroleum Law
● Approval of the De-Baathification Law
● Approval of the Militia Law
● Iraqi increase of 2007 over 2006 levels
● The Central Bank of Iraq to increase interest rates to 20% and appreciate the dinar by 10% to combat inflation
● Increase domestic refined petroleum prices and sell imported fuel at market prices
These were scheduled for the end of 2006 or early 2007.
By March 2007:
● A referendum on constitutional amendments
By April 2007:
● Iraqi control of the army
By May 2007:
● Completion of Militia Law implementation
● Approval of amnesty agreement
● completion of reconciliation efforts
By June 2007:
● Provincial elections
By September 2007:
● Iraqi control of the Provinces
By December 2007:
● Iraqi security self-reliance, with US support
Recommendations 24-39 are in support of these objectives. Most of them are either platitudes (“The United States should encourage dialogue between sectarian communities ...”), warn the President to keep his hands off (“Iraqi amnesty proposals must not be undercut in Washington by either the Executive or Legislative branch ...), or seek to turn over responsibility to international bodies (“The United States should support the presence of neutral international experts ... to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate militia members ...”).
Finally, the recommendations deal with a US military strategy for Iraq, and US economic assistance. The Iraq study group report simultaneously espouses a plan to get our troops out in the next 12-18 months, and promotes an increase in troop levels embedded with the Iraqi army in the meantime. The critical sentence reads, “By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not needed for force protection could be out of Iraq.” Even then, the report envisions US combat forces “embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and special operations teams, and in training, equipping, advising, force protection, and search and rescue ... we would maintain a considerable military presence in the region.”
Even with its criticism of the neo-con Iraq position, the study group has nevertheless, perhaps unconsciously, bought into their world view: “Because of the importance of Iraq to our regional security goals and our on-going fight against Al Qaeda ... we rejected the immediate withdrawal of our troops, because we believe so much is at stake.” The report does deny certain courses of action: “we do not believe the needed levels (100,000 to 200,000 more troop) are available for a sustained deployment ... we also rejected the immediate withdrawal of our troops ...The United States should not make an open ended commitment to keep large numbers of American troops deployed in Iraq.” Recommendations 40-45 give form to this outlook, and include a shift in military priorities to training and equipping Iraqi army and counterterrorism.
Recommendations 46-49 are concerned with retraining returning troops, replacing expended and damaged equipment, and restore civility and cooperation between the Department of Defense and the military. (What a statement!)
Recommendations 50-61 involve our stance towards the Iraqi police and courts. It is suggests that the National Police and Border Police be absorbed by the Ministry of Defense, and that the Iraqi Police Service be given responsibility for criminal investigations. (See our previous article for the distinction between these police groups.) Police pay should be the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior. Embedding American police trainers with the Iraqi police should be expanded. New facilities should be built.
Recommendations 62 and 63 concern themselves with the oil industry. Recommendation 62 deals with the short term and states that “The U.S. government should encourage the Iraqi government to accelerate contracting for the comprehensive well work-overs to the southern fields needed to increase production .... The U.S. military should work with the Iraqi military and private security forces (Italics added.) to protect oil infrastructure and contractors ... a program to improve pipeline security by paying local tribes solely on the basis of throughput ... Metering should be implemented at both ends of the supply line ...press Iraq to continue reducing subsidies in the energy sector ... Until Iraqis pay market prices for oil products, drastic fuel shortage will remain.” Recommendation 63 promotes professionalization of oil industry management.
Recommendations 64-67 call for increasing U.S funding for capacity building and job creation on a non-sectarian basis, more reconstruction should be done by “international partners”, and humanitarian assistance for refugees should be shunted to the United Nations. The President should create a Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction for Iraq.
Recommendations 68-71 are attempts to improve the effectiveness of U.S. assistance programs. The only recommendation of any significance is #71: “Authority to merge U.S. funds with those from international donors and Iraqi participants on behalf of assistance programs should be provided.”
Recommendation 72 is one of the few substantive recommendations: Costs for the war in Iraq should be included in the President's budget request. (Unfortunately, not until 2008.) “Congress must carry out its constitutional responsibility to review budget requests for the war in Iraq carefully and to conduct oversight.
Recommendations 73-79 concern U.S. personnel in Iraq and U.S. intelligence gathering there. There is a plea to “accord the highest possible priority to professional language proficiency and cultural training ... They need to train for and conduct joint operations across agency boundaries ... establish a Foreign Service Reserve Corps ... devote significantly greater analytic resources to the task of understanding the threats and sources of violence in Iraq ... CIA should provide additional personnel in Iraq to develop and train an effective counterintelligence service.” In support of these recommendations, the report states that “Congress has appropriated almost $2 billion this year for counterterrorism measures ... but the administration has not put forward a request to invest comparable resources in trying to understand the people who fabricate, plant and explode these [IED] devices ... There is significant underreporting of the violence in Iraq ... If we cannot determine the source of a sectarian attack, the assault doesn't make it into the database. A roadside bomb or a rocket or mortar attack that doesn't hurt U.S. personnel doesn't count.”
The Iraq Study Group Report has done a valuable service by laying out, in clear language, the false premises underlying our invasion and the incompetence of the civilian direction of our military effort. The recommendations that follow, however, often repeat the flawed thinking that got us into this mess to begin with, are too little and too late even where they make sense, and don't address in any competent way the critical question: Is our staying in Iraq better or worse than our leaving. Instead of recognizing that our clumsiness has broken the basket of eggs and further poking around will merely break more, the recommendations promote the fantasy that we can somehow put at least some of the eggs back together. Even at that, the report's vision of U.S. troops withdrawing by early 2008 is far more productive than President Bush's “surge” variation on staying the course.
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