Issue #51
Last Update May 5, 2007
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International The Iraq Study Group Report by David Katz December 12, 2006 New York Stringer Magazine, as an on-going service to its readers of actually reading the text of significant legislation and governments reports, has gone through the Iraq Study Group Report in detail. In this first of two articles, we summarize the content of the report, concentrating on the Assessment section. In the second article, we will concentrate on the report's recommendations, highlighting those we think the Study Group got right, and describing and criticizing those where we think the Study Group went astray.
The Iraq Study Group has provided a useful service to the American public by publishing its report and making it generally available, flawed though the report may be. The report itself is divided into two sections: Assessment, an evaluation of the current Iraq situation and three of the courses of action that have been debated; and The Way Forward – A New Approach, which lays out the Study Group's recommended course of action and the 79 specific recommendations to implement it. In addition, an Executive Summary recaps the report contents in the style that executive summaries generally take: putting into a few inadequate paragraphs material that required (depending on type size) over 100 pages to discuss. Appendices list those who participated in the study process.
The Assessment section is valuable for its critique of the current situation, but flawed in that there is no discussion of how we got there. The Way Forward section has some valuable recommendations (many of which are really criticisms of the President, Secretary of Defense and other members of the Executive branch), and many other recommendations that are vague, impractical or completely off the point. The Letter from the Co-Chairs, which begins the document, gives as the aim of the report the building of a bipartisan consensus as to the present status of Iraq and the actions that should be taken going forward. Since the report was issued unanimously by a bipartisan group, the Study Group obviously believes that aim is achievable.
The Assessment section is divided into an assessment of the current situation, the consequences of continued decline in Iraq, some alternative courses in Iraq (none of which is the the Study Group's recommended approach), and a brief subsection, two paragraphs long, which finally state a goal for our presence there. Though it does come late in the document, this definition of goals precedes the recommendations for action, and provides a framework for analyzing and evaluating them. To quote the report, “We agree with the goal of U.S. policy in Iraq, as stated by the President: an Iraq that can 'govern itself, sustain itself, and defend itself.'” Perhaps realizing that this statement is vapid, the report goes on to say, “In our view, this definition entails an Iraq with a broadly representative government that maintains its territorial integrity, is at peace with its neighbors, denies terrorism a sanctuary, and doesn't brutalize its own people.”
The assessment of the current situation is itself divided into sections: Security, Politics, Economics, International Support and Conclusions. The Security section is grim. “Violence is increasing in scope, complexity and lethality ... Most attacks on Americans still come from the Sunni Arab insurgency ... It has significant support within the Sunni Arab community ... The insurgency has no single leadership but is a network of networks ... arms and financing are supplied primarily from within Iraq ...Al Qaeda in Iraq is now largely Iraqi-run and composed of Sunni Arabs ... The United Nation s estimates that 1.6 million are displaced within Iraq, and up to 1.8 million Iraqis have fled the country ... Four of Iraq's eighteen provinces are highly insecure ... These provinces account for 40 percent of Iraq's population of 26 million ... The most stable parts of the country are the three provinces of the Kurdish north and parts of the Shia south ... however, most of Iraq's cities have a sectarian mix and are plagued by persistent violence.”
The strain placed on the US military is detailed: “Nearly every U.S. Army and Marine comb at unit, and several National Guard and Reserve units, have been to Iraq at least once ... Many military units are under significant strain ...many units do not have fully functional equipment for training when they redeploy to the United States ... The American military has little reserve force to call on if it needs ground forces to respond to other crises around the world.”
The evaluation of Iraqi military and police forces is even grimmer: “... elements of the Army have refused to carry out missions ... Units lack leadership ... Units lack equipment ... The entire appropriation for Iraqi defense forces for FY 2006 ($3 Billion) is less than the United States currently spends in Iraq every two weeks ... Units lack personnel ... Soldiers are paid in cash because there is no banking system ... Units lack logistics and support ... The state of the Iraqi police is substantially worse than that of the Iraqi Army ... It has neither the training nor legal authority to conduct criminal investigations, nor the firepower to take on organized crime, insurgents or militias ... they routinely engage in sectarian violence ... There is no clear Iraqi or U.S./ agreement on the character and mission of the police ... The facilities Protection Service [guards for government offices and facilities] poses additional problems .. these units have questionable loyalties and capabilities ... One senior U.S. Official described the Facilities Protection Service as 'incompetent, dysfunctional, or subversive'.”
The section on Politics is equally depressing. Describing the government: “The composition of the Iraqi government is basically sectarian, and key players within the Government too often act in their sectarian interest. Iraq's Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish leaders frequently fail to demonstrate the political will to act in Iraq's national interest, and too many Iraqi ministries lack the capacity to govern effectively. The result is an even weaker central government than the constitution provides.” After a discussion of some of the key leaders of each faction, the report states: “... because Iraq's energy resources are in the Kurdish and Shia regions, there is no economically feasible 'Sunni Region'. Particularly contentious is a provision in the constitution that shares revenues nationally from current oil reserves, while allowing revenues from reserves discovered in the future to go to the regions.”
Under the heading “Governance”, the report states: “The Iraqi government is not effectively providing its people with basic services: electricity, drinking water, sewage, health care and education ... the government sometimes provides services on a sectarian basis ... security is lacking ... Insurgents target key infrastructures ... corruption is rampant ... Most of Iraq's technocratic class was pushed out of the government as part of de-Baathification ... the judiciary is weak ... criminal investigations are conducted by magistrates, and they are too few and inadequately trained ... 'We can protect judges, but not their families, their extended families, their friends.'”
The Economics section describes the Iraqi economy as “badly shocked, and is dysfunctional after suffering decades of problems.” While currency reserves are stable and growing, and consumer imports (especially of electronics) have increased dramatically, and wheat yields in Kurdistan have increased more than 40 percent this past year, inflation is above 50 percent, and unemployment estimates range from 20 to 60 percent. Oil production remains below prewar levels. Add to this the effect of corruption: “Experts estimate that 150,000 to 200,000 – and perhaps as many as 500,000 – barrels of oil per day are being stolen.”
The U.S.-Led Reconstruction Efforts section points to $21 billion having been committed for this purpose, with little to show for it. The short International Support section deals with international aid to Iraq, and indicates that little has been committed and less has been received. In addition, “the Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, hold large amounts of Iraqi debt that they have not forgiven.” The section titled “The Region” discusses the impact of the Iraq situation on nearby countries: “U.S. efforts in Afghanistan have been complicated by the overriding focus of U.S. attention and resources on Iraq ... Iran is negotiating with the United States in the streets of Baghdad ...Funding for the Sunni insurgency comes from private individuals within Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.”
An interesting section is the one titled “Consequences of Continued Decline in Iraq”. A list of consequences is given, but no attempt is made to distinguish between those consequences that could be ameliorated by continued U.S. presence and those that could be ameliorated by the departure of U.S. troops. Consequences include: continuing violence could lead toward greater chaos; terrorism could grow; the global standing of the United States could suffer; continued problems in Iraq could lead to greater polarization within the United States; continued problems in Iraq could also lead to greater Iraqi opposition to the United States. All of these consequences are already being felt, despite the U.S. troops and other workers on the ground; it is difficult to see that their continued presence would avert further consequences.
The Study Group Report deserves at least a B+ for its unsparing description of the failure of our Iraqi efforts. It loses points for its lack of discussion of how we got there in the first place, which would have shed some light on how the failures occurred, and would have informed the discussion of what to do next. In our next article, we will discuss the three “straw men” alternatives outlined in the “Some Alternative Courses in Iraq” section, and the 79 recommendations put forth in place of these alternatives. It is these recommendations that will be the focus of discussion in the press, the Congress and the Oval Office.
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